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Abstract
Global governance rests on the exercise of public authority by a myriad of actors. In the international order, the more powers and influence these actors acquire, the more their legitimacy
proves to be controversial. It is submitted here that the legitimacy of international, regional, and
domestic actors that partake in global governance—those considered here as global actors—must
be appraised from a two-fold standpoint. Their legitimacy can first be gauged through the lens
of the origin of their powers. This is what this Article calls the legitimacy of origin. The origin
of the power may often prove an insufficient indicator of an actor’s legitimacy. For this reason,
legitimacy is also evaluated in light of the way in which the actor exercises its power. This is what
this Article calls the legitimacy of exercise. This Article is based on the assumption that failing to
recognize this dual character of legitimacy of actors involved in global and regional governance
can undermine any endeavor to grasp the contemporary complexity of the latter. The legitimacy
of global actors is primarily a question about how, when exercising public authority, this actor is
perceived as having a “right to rule.” In that sense, there is no doubt that the question of legitimacy
of global actors exercising public authority is, to a large extent, a moral question. Yet, this Article
does not seek to examine the moral criteria through which the legitimacy of actors exercising public authority on the international plane ought to be established. This has artfully been endeavored
elsewhere. This Article is—more modestly—concerned with the distinction between different
faces of legitimacy that should arguably be taken into account when making a (moral) evaluation,
as well as how the importance of these various dimensions of legitimacy have been fluctuating in
practice. It thus attempts to unearth the multiple faces of legitimacy and the evolutions thereof,
irrespective of the moral criteria which could eventually be used in each case. Another important
preliminary caveat must be formulated. It cannot be denied that the legitimacy of an authority
classically impinges on the extent to which the rules it prescribes are deemed legitimate. The legitimacy of such rules will not only bear upon the authority and the degree of compliance with
the rule, but it also impacts the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, which in turns affects
its viability.7 This Article, however,while not ignoring that the legitimacy of the actors affects
the legitimacy of the rules and of the system, is not concerned with either of these two questions
and solely concentrates on the legitimacy of international actors. Yet, it will be shown that the
legitimacy of exercise, because it requires an examination of how public authority is exercised,
cannot always be severed from the question of legitimacy of rules. After sketching some of the
contemporary features of legitimacy in international law in Part I, this Article focuses on the extent to which the so-called principle of democratic legitimacy has impinged on how legitimacy

of global actors is conceived today in Part II. In Part III, this Article then turns to assessing how,
against that backdrop, legitimacy of global actors is evaluated in contemporary practice. Although
not ignoring that the question of legitimacy may arise in connection with other actors, this Article
focuses on two public global actors in particular, namely governments and international organizations,8 with a view to demonstrating that the appraisal of the legitimacy of governments differs
from the legitimacy of international organizations. This Article argues that while the legitimacy
of origin has constituted the classical measure to evaluate the legitimacy of governments, recent
practice has shifted the paradigm toward the legitimacy of exercise. This Article also submits that
the exact opposite paradigm shift is simultaneously taking place in the context of the legitimacy
of international organizations, for the legitimacy of international organizations is incrementally
reviewed from the vantage point of the legitimacy of origin, despite having classically been based
on the legitimacy of exercise.

THE COMPLEMENTARY FACES OF LEGITIMACY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGITIMACY OF
ORIGIN AND THE LEGITIMACY OF EXERCISE
Jean d’Aspremont * and Eric De Brabandere **
INTRODUCTION
Global governance rests on the exercise of public authority
by a myriad of actors. In the international order, the more
powers and influence these actors acquire, the more their
legitimacy proves to be controversial. It is submitted here that the
legitimacy of international, regional, and domestic actors that
partake in global governance—those considered here as global
actors—must be appraised from a two-fold standpoint. Their
legitimacy can first be gauged through the lens of the origin of
their powers. This is what this Article calls the legitimacy of origin.
The origin of the power may often prove an insufficient indicator
of an actor’s legitimacy. For this reason, legitimacy is also
evaluated in light of the way in which the actor exercises its power.
This is what this Article calls the legitimacy of exercise. This Article
is based on the assumption that failing to recognize this dual
character of legitimacy of actors involved in global and regional
governance can undermine any endeavor to grasp the
contemporary complexity of the latter.
The legitimacy of global actors is primarily a question about
how, when exercising public authority, this actor is perceived as
having a “right to rule.”1 In that sense, there is no doubt that the
question of legitimacy of global actors exercising public authority

* Associate Professor, Amsterdam Centre for International Law (ACIL), University
of Amsterdam. This Article is an extended version of a book chapter entitled The Duality
of Legitimacy of Global Actors in the International Legal Order in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD (Matthew Happold ed., forthcoming 2011).
** Assistant Professor and Senior Lecturer, Grotius Centre for International Legal
Studies, University of Leiden.
1. See Allen Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2009); John Tasioulas,
The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, supra.
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is, to a large extent, a moral question.2 Yet, this Article does not
seek to examine the moral criteria through which the legitimacy
of actors exercising public authority on the international plane
ought to be established. This has artfully been endeavored
elsewhere.3 This Article is—more modestly—concerned with the
distinction between different faces of legitimacy that should
arguably be taken into account when making a (moral)
evaluation, as well as how the importance of these various
dimensions of legitimacy have been fluctuating in practice. It
thus attempts to unearth the multiple faces of legitimacy and the
evolutions thereof, irrespective of the moral criteria which could
eventually be used in each case.
Another important preliminary caveat must be formulated.
It cannot be denied that the legitimacy of an authority classically
impinges on the extent to which the rules it prescribes are
deemed legitimate.4 The legitimacy of such rules will not only
bear upon the authority and the degree of compliance with the
rule,5 but it also impacts the legitimacy of the legal system as a
whole,6 which in turns affects its viability.7 This Article, however,
while not ignoring that the legitimacy of the actors affects the
legitimacy of the rules and of the system, is not concerned with
either of these two questions and solely concentrates on the
legitimacy of international actors. Yet, it will be shown that the
legitimacy of exercise, because it requires an examination of how
2. See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 80; Thomas Christiano, Democratic Legitimacy and
International Institutions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, supra note 1;
Philip Pettit, Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-Republican Perspective, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, supra note 1.
3. See supra note 1.
4. See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 80.
5. The question of the legitimacy of a rule classically relates to the reasons why
rules are obeyed. It accordingly touches on the theories of compliance. See THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 204–07 (1990); Thomas M.
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 (1988); Ian Hurd,
Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379, 379–408 (1999). See
generally Claire K. Kelly, Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
101 (2005). For a critical approach to the concept of compliance, see generally Benedict
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International
Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998).
6. For a moral evaluation of the legitimacy of international law as a whole, see
generally ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
7. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193–200 (2d ed. 1997) (viewing “the
minimal content of natural law” as a condition of viability for the system).
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public authority is exercised, cannot always be severed from the
question of legitimacy of rules.
After sketching some of the contemporary features of
legitimacy in international law in Part I, this Article focuses on
the extent to which the so-called principle of democratic
legitimacy has impinged on how legitimacy of global actors is
conceived today in Part II. In Part III, this Article then turns to
assessing how, against that backdrop, legitimacy of global actors
is evaluated in contemporary practice. Although not ignoring
that the question of legitimacy may arise in connection with
other actors, this Article focuses on two public global actors in
particular, namely governments and international organizations,8
with a view to demonstrating that the appraisal of the legitimacy
of governments differs from the legitimacy of international
organizations. This Article argues that while the legitimacy of
origin has constituted the classical measure to evaluate the
legitimacy of governments, recent practice has shifted the
paradigm toward the legitimacy of exercise. This Article also
submits that the exact opposite paradigm shift is simultaneously
taking place in the context of the legitimacy of international
organizations, for the legitimacy of international organizations is
incrementally reviewed from the vantage point of the legitimacy
of origin, despite having classically been based on the legitimacy
of exercise.
I.

LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

As has been indicated, this Article draws on a distinction
between the legitimacy of exercise and the legitimacy of origin.
This dichotomy points to a distinction between the legitimacy
pertaining to the source of power and the legitimacy related to the
exercise of power.9 The division between these two dimensions of
legitimacy has been part of the legal and political discourse for

8. This Article uses the term “international organization” as it is classically
understood in international legal scholarship: intergovernmental associations of States,
commonly created by treaty. As such, the term includes intergovernmental and
supranational organizations.
9. Though not addressing the issue of legitimacy, Friedrich A. Hayek offers a good
explanation for the distinction between the exercise of power and the source of power.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 71 (1976).
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several years10 although the terminology has varied. Some have
used the terms “original legitimacy” and “legitimacy of conduct
or exercise,”11 while others have preferred “instant legitimacy”
and “continual legitimacy,”12 or have used the similar notions of
“representative democracy” and “participatory democracy.”13
This Article uses the terms “legitimacy of origin” and “legitimacy
of exercise.”14
The distinction between the legitimacy of origin and the
legitimacy of exercise has classically been explored against the
backdrop of the legitimacy of a government. In this particular
context, the legitimacy of origin is a tool to assess the manner in
which a government comes to power (e.g., coup, dynasty,
election), while the legitimacy of exercise permits evaluation of
the way in which the government exerts its power. It is the
intention of this Article to also examine how this dichotomy
applies to actors other than governments and, in particular,
international organizations.
It is important to note here that, in the context of the
legitimacy of governments, the distinction between legitimacy of
origin and legitimacy of exercise only concerns the external—and
not the internal—legitimacy of a government. The legitimacy of a
government can be measured from two different standpoints.
One can assess its internal legitimacy—how it is perceived by the
people subject to it—and its external legitimacy—how it is perceived
by other international authorities.15 The internal legitimacy of an
10. Organization of American States, Meeting the Political Priorities of the Organization
of American States, O.A.S.T.S. Doc. No. CP/doc.4071/05, at 3 (Dec. 14, 2005) (“The
Secretariat will continue to work to ensure the legitimacy of origin of governments
(electoral observation, etc.) but will broaden its work to assist with the legitimacy of
exercise of government (governance).”).
11. See Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism,
7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 261, 261–328 (2003).
12. See, e.g., Vesna Pusić, Democracy Versus Nation: Dictatorships with Democratic
Legitimacy, 5 HELSINKI MONITOR 69, 80 (1994).
13. On the notion of participatory democracy in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, see generally Jarat Chopra & Tanja Hohe, Participatory Intervention, 10 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 289 (2004).
14. This distinction has been used by Jean d’Aspremont in Legitimacy of Governments
in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 877, 894 (2006).
15. The distinction between internal and external legitimacy only relates to the
position of the observer. It does not have any bearing upon the measures that are used
to carry out the test of legitimacy. This means that external legitimacy can focus on the
respect for the rights of the individual but as seen through the lens of foreign
governments.
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authority is usually related to the achievement of social and
distributive justice,16 and thus revolves around the existence of a
government for the people.17 It is this type of legitimacy that, as
Weber famously explained in another context, enhances the
stability of an authority and secures obedience.18 The internal
legitimacy is, however, of little relevance to the appraisal of
government, especially from the standpoint of international law.
Indeed, international law is only concerned with the way in which
a government’s legitimacy is perceived by other international
authorities. In that sense, the application of international law is
not directly contingent upon the perception of the people,
although it cannot be denied that the internal legitimacy of a
given authority affects the way other actors assess the external
legitimacy of that authority.19
The distinction between internal and external legitimacy has
classically been less relevant in the context of international
organizations. Strictly speaking, there is no subject-sovereign
relationship between individuals and international organizations.
It must be acknowledged, however, that more recently some
international organizations have embarked on missions that
include the administration of territories, in which case
individuals within those territories are subject to the authority of
the intergovernmental organization.20 Other international
organizations, like the European Union (“EU”), are endowed
16. On the relationship between justice and democracy, see generally IAN SHAPIRO,
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999).
17. This has been called “output legitimacy” as opposed to “input legitimacy” (i.e.,
a government by the people). For such a distinction, see Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy and
the Multi-Actor Polity, in ORGANIZING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: ESSAYS FOR JOHAN P.
OLSEN 268 (Morton Egeberg & Per Lægreid eds., 1999).
18. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 31 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1968); see also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 200–01
(1832); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L
L. 46, 48 (1992); Robert Grafstein, The Legitimacy of Political Institutions, 14 POLITY 51, 51
(1981).
19. See the criterion of “representativity” (the degree to which a government
represents its people) that is often resorted to in the recognition policy of states. On this
question, see Stefan Talmon, Who Is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative
Criteria for Governmental Legitimacy in International Law, in THE REALITY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 509–17 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill
& Stefan Talmon eds., 1999).
20. See generally ERIC DE BRABANDERE, POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITIONAL
AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN OCCUPATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2009).
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with sweeping powers that directly affect the lives of people. This
means that there are an increasing number of instances where
the legitimacy of international organizations can be construed
from an internal perspective as well.
A remark must also be formulated about when and how
legitimacy of global actors is generally tested. In this respect, it
should be briefly emphasized that governmental legitimacy is not
constantly under scrutiny in the international legal order.
Legitimacy is only intermittently tested. This is well illustrated by
the question of legitimacy of governments. Even if much
attention is often paid to the form of governments in the
international arena, the assessment of their legitimacy is not
systematic. The mere measurement of the democratic character
of government does not necessarily involve an evaluation—which
is very common in international relations—of its legitimacy.21
The question of legitimacy only arises when there is a need to
determine the authority entrusted with the power to act and
speak on behalf of the state. Such a determination is only
required in limited, but significant, situations. The authority that
can speak and act on behalf of the state in the international legal
order must be determined ahead of any recognition of
government,
when
accreditation
within
international
organizations is sought by two warring governments, or when a
state invites another state to carry out a military operation on its

21. This is well illustrated by international economic relations that are the most
common leverage for various sorts of policies. These relations are often conditioned
upon compliance with democratic principles. The suspension or the severance of
economic relations following a breach of democracy is not tantamount to a judgment
about legitimacy. Indeed, the government barred from cooperating with another
because of its nondemocratic character is not necessarily seen as illegitimate by the
former. On US international economic policy, see generally HOSSEIN G. ASKARI ET AL.,
CASE STUDIES OF U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE CHINESE, CUBAN, AND IRANIAN
EXPERIENCE (2003); MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE (1990);
ZACHARY SELDEN, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
(1999). Regarding the international financial relations, see BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK (1992). On the
importance of democracy in the European international economic relations, see the
Cotonou Agreement between the European Community and the African, Carribean,
and Pacific (“ACP”) Countries signed on June 23, 2000 and concluded for a twenty-year
period from March 2000 to February 2020. Partnership Agreement between the
Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the
European Community and Its Member States, on the Other Part, June 23, 2000, O.J. L
317 (2000).
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own territory. The tests of legitimacy applied in each of these
contexts have usually been centered on the legitimacy of origin.22
In the case of international organizations, occasions where
their legitimacy has been tested have, until recently, remained
rather scarce. This may happen when states are confronted with
the growing powers of international organizations, for instance,
on the basis of the implied powers doctrine.23 Likewise, the
question of the legitimacy of international organizations may
arise when, in the context of a reform of the constitutive treaty of
the organizations concerned, the endowment of more powers to
the organization is envisaged. The same is true when states
consider terminating the organization or withdrawing from it. In
recent years, the greater involvement of international
organizations in the reconstruction and administration of states
in the aftermath of conflicts has, however, offered new instances
where the legitimacy of international organizations has been
tested.24 Indeed, the question of the legitimacy of these
international organizations has been raised since on these
occasions they have been endowed with wide-ranging powers
bearing inevitable resemblance to sovereign power over
individuals. The last part of this Article is especially devoted to
the question of legitimacy of international organizations in the
context of post-conflict administrations.
A word must also be said about the historical relevance of the
distinction between the legitimacy of exercise and the legitimacy
of origin. While it only has been recently systematized, the
distinction between legitimacy of exercise and origin helps one
understand the practice even at a time when there were no
international organizations and international relations were
exclusively within the hands of states. It is true that the legitimacy
of origin was the dominant criterion, at least so long as the
legitimacy of a government hinged on its dynastic origin.25
22. For an analysis of these cases where legitimacy of government is tested, see
d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 877–918.
23. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
24. On the contemporary practice of international administration of territories, see
DE BRABANDERE, supra note 20.
25. This entailed that only dynastic authorities were recognized. See Gregory H.
Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 48, 49
(1992).
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Following the ideas developed by Locke26 and Rousseau27 that
were later magnified by the American and French Revolutions,
legitimacy came to be linked to “the will of the people.”28 As
Roth explains, even before the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, “almost all states—whether liberal democracies,
one-party revolutionary states, military dictatorships, or
traditionalist regimes—subscribed to the notion that ‘the will of
the people’ constitutes the ultimate source of governmental
legitimacy.”29 In that sense, a government was deemed legitimate
if it could be said to be a government “by the people,”30 a
criterion that, again, hints at the origin of the authority. But the
early practice of international relations is also pervaded by cases
where legitimacy was assessed through the lens of the exercise of
power, as illustrated by the continuous importance of the
effectiveness of the authority.31 The history of international
relations has thus witnessed the recourse to both the legitimacy
of origin and the legitimacy of exercise. The end of the Cold War
and the emergence of democracy as the only acceptable model of
domestic governance have revived the relevance of this
distinction. This point is further discussed in the following
section.
II. LEGITIMACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY
There is little doubt that the end of the Cold War and the
sweeping fallout of that event on the international plane have
impinged significantly on international law and the manner in
that legitimacy is perceived in the international legal order.
26. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (J. M. Dent & Sons 1962)
(1690).
27. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1762).
28. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and the
American Bill Of Rights: A Bicentennial Commemoration. S. DOC. NO. 101–09 (1989);
FRIEDRICH GENTZ, THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS COMPARED (John Quincy
Adams trans., Henry Regnery Company 1955) (1800).
29. BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38
(2000).
30. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Admantios Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), reprinted in
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 318–19 (H.A. Washington ed., 1859) (emphasis
added).
31. This means that only effective governments are recognized. See P.K. MENON,
THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–68 (1994). For a discussion of the
different “vehicles of legitimation,” see ROTH, supra note 29, at 41–51.
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Indeed, the demise of communist regimes put an end to the
ideological division that had gripped the world for nearly fifty
years. This has unmistakably caused remarkable changes in
international society, however short-lived they may be. In
particular, the idea that democracy is the only acceptable type of
regime has gained broad support, even monopolizing the
political discourse32 (despite a lingering disagreement about its
accurate meaning33). It is accordingly no surprise that
international law and its rules pertaining to the legitimacy of
governments have been deeply affected by the rise of democracy
as the only acceptable model of governance at the domestic level.
Before spelling out the precise consequences of the emergence
of a consensus about democracy on the legitimacy of global
actors itself, it is necessary to briefly take stock of the state of
international law pertaining to democratic governance.
A. Democracy in International Law
International legal scholars promptly recognized that the
post-Cold War international legal order had become more
amenable to the prominent role of democracy. American liberal
scholars, in particular, have enthusiastically supported the idea
that democracy today plays a crucial role in the international
legal order and have swiftly provided various optimistic accounts
of the extent of the legal changes brought about by democracy.34
French positivist lawyers, although they have usually voiced
greater skepticism and refrained from embracing the whole array
of consequences that liberals attached to a lack of democracy,
32. See generally SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS 30–49 (2000);
see also Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and
its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1–4 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
33. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 6 (1987). But see
Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization and
International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885, 889–90 (2004).
34. The most radical liberal view on this question is probably offered by Fernando
R. Tesón in The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 54–55 (1992).
For milder forms of the democratic entitlement theory, see Christina M. Cerna,
Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 289, 329 (1995); Franck, supra note 18, 47–48. For an overview of how
participatory rights emerged in international law, see Fox, supra note 25, at 10–33. For a
basic account of the arguments for and against the democratic entitlement theory, see
generally Fox & Roth, supra note 32.
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have also recognized that democracy can play a role in the
international legal order.35 Even if one does not agree with all
the legal consequences that American scholars have associated
with the emergence of democracy in the international legal
order,36 it is reasonable to contend that living up to some
democratic standards corresponds with an international
customary obligation. Indeed, contemporary practice shows that,
to a large degree, states consider the adoption of the main
characteristics of a democratic regime to amount to an
international obligation and act accordingly toward
nondemocratic states.37 It is of particular relevance that many
nondemocratic states do not oppose the principle of democracy,
and even claim that they are themselves in the midst of progress
toward the establishment of democracy.38 In that sense,
nondemocratic states, with a view to strengthening the legitimacy
of their government, try to portray their political regime in a
democratic fashion rather than choosing to dispute the role that
democracy plays in the international order.
Nonetheless, this customary legal obligation to adopt a
democratic regime must not be exaggerated—such overreaching
is where the aforementioned liberal theories about democracy
prove unconvincing.39 First, the scope of ratione materiae of the
35. See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, L’ETAT NON DEMOCRATIQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL.
ETUDE CRITIQUE DU DROIT POSITIF ET DE LA PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINE [THE NONDEMOCRATIC STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. CRITICAL STUDY OF POSITIVE LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE] 263–93 (2008). For earlier analyses, see LINOS-ALEXANDRE
SICILIANOS, L’O.N.U. ET LA DEMOCRATISATION DE L’ETAT: SYSTEMES REGIONAUX ET
ORDRE JURIDIQUE UNIVERSEL [THE U.N. AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE STATE:
REGIONAL SYSTEMS AND UNIVERSAL LEGAL ORDER] 31 (2000); Pierre Klein, Le droit aux
élections libres en droit international: Mythes et réalités [The Right to Free Elections in
International Law: Myths and Realities], in LA RECHERCHE DU NOUVEL ORDRE MONDIAL
[THE SEARCH FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER] 93, 95–98 (Olivier Corten et al. eds., 1993).
36. For one criticism of the liberal theories of democracy, see D’ASPREMONT, supra
note 35.
37. See id.
38. For one example, consider the recent events in Pakistan. In particular, see
Carlotta Gall et al., Rebuffing U.S., Musharraf Calls Crackdown Crucial to a Fair Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1 (interviewing President Musharraf). Musharraf has since
stepped down from military leadership. See, e.g., David Rohde & Carlotta Gall, In
Musharraf’s Shadow, a New Hope for Pakistan Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at A3. Also
relevant are the developments in Myanmar. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Myanmar Claims Step
to Democracy, but Junta Still Grips to Power, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 4, 2007, at N3. See
also LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 8–9 (1999).
39. See D’ASPREMONT, supra note 35.
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principle of democracy in international law is limited, as the
obligation rests on only an electoral and procedural understanding
of democracy.40 States are customarily obliged to abide by
democracy to the sole extent that their effective leaders (or the
parliamentary body that oversees their executive mandate) are
chosen through free and fair elections.41 Likewise, this customary
obligation, while being erga omnes,42 is certainly not of a jus cogens
character, as it is underscored by the existence of numerous
persistent objectors to that customary rule.43
It would also be a mistake to consider the obligation to be
democratic utterly groundbreaking. The development of a
customary norm in this area is unsurprising, given that
international law has long regulated some aspects of states’
political regimes. Through human rights law, the international
community has regulated the way in which power is exercised
and has prohibited some types of political regimes—for example,
apartheid44 and, to a lesser extent, fascism.45 Moreover, the
obligation to organize free and fair elections is not entirely new
in the international legal order, as a similar obligation is already
embedded in the International Covenant on Civil and Political

40. See Fox, supra note 25. For criticism of this “minimalistic” understanding of
democracy, see DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 8–9; Barry Gills et al., Low Intensity Democracy,
in LOW INTENSITY DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL POWER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3, 21
(Barry Gills et al. eds., 1993); J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMORATIC POLITICAL THEORY 3–15
(1979); Richard Burchill, Book Review, The Developing International Law of Democracy, 64
MOD. L. REV. 123, 128 (2001) (reviewing Fox and Roth’s Democratic Governance and
International Law); Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise
of Democracy, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 601, 603–05 (2003).
41. See D’ASPREMONT, supra note 35, at 15.
42. Id. at 291.
43. The People’s Republic of China and several states in the Middle East can
probably be considered persistent objectors to that rule. See, e.g., ZHANG LIANG, THE
TIANANMEN PAPERS (Andrew J. Nathan & Perry Link eds., 2001).
44. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, July 18, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. III, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.
195. For UN resolutions condemning apartheid, see S.C. Res. 288, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/288 (Nov. 17, 1970); S.C. Res. 277, U.N. Doc. S/RES/277 (Mar. 18, 1970); S.C.
Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968); S.C. Res. 221, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221
(Apr. 9, 1966); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966); S.C. Res. 216, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/216 (Nov. 12, 1965); S.C. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 12, 1965);
G.A. Res. 1791, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1791 (Dec. 11, 1962); G.A. Res. 1598, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1598 (Apr. 13, 1961).
45. See G.A. Res. 36/162, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/162 (Dec. 16, 1981).
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Rights (“ICCPR”),46 which has been ratified by 161 states.47 It
must be pointed out, however, that even if the international legal
order enshrines a principle of procedural democracy applicable to
the political regime of states, there is no corresponding
requirement of democracy applicable to the structure and
functioning of the international legal system as a whole. This is
not totally astonishing, given the inapplicability of the classical
domestic blueprints of governance to the international system.48
Despite its limited ambit, democracy has borne observable
legal consequences. This is especially true in connection with the
ability of states to take countermeasures to sanction violations of
democracy. Indeed, notwithstanding the safeguarding clause
adopted by the International Law Commission,49 there is a fair
amount of practice as well as scholarship buttressing the idea
that, in the case of the violation of democracy, all states—or at
least those states party to the ICCPR, when the obligation only
arises under that treaty—are entitled to take countermeasures
against the offending state.50 Given the dramatic impact such
sanctions may have, one should not underestimate the
importance of such a remedy.
B.

Democratic Legitimacy of Global Public Actors

Because rules pertaining to democracy in international law
are restricted to domestic governance, their impact is
46. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 95-29 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See generally Andreas
Mavrommatis, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Role in
Promoting Democracy, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 255
(Kalliopi Koufa ed., 2000).
47. See Katie Lee, China and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Prospects and Challenges, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 445 (2007) (on the possible ratification of
the ICCPR by the People’s Republic of China); Office for U.N. Comm’r for Human
Rights, Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (July
14, 2006), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/status.pdf; see also James C.
McKinley Jr., Cuba Signs Two Treaties on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A6.
48. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law: Governance,
Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 547 (2004).
49. See G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 54, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2001).
50. See U.N. Int’l. Law Comm’n, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, 137–39 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Report] (discussing practices mentioned by
the special rapporteur in its commentary on Article 54); see also Christian J. Tams,
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 220–21 (2005); sources cited
supra note 35.

202 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:190
unsurprisingly almost exclusively limited to the legitimacy of
governments. Their application to the legitimacy of international
organizations is less evident given that rules pertaining to
domestic governance cannot always easily be transposed as such
at the level of international organizations. Eventually, it must be
acknowledged that international organizations are not subjected
to the international obligations to abide by some procedural
form of democracy in organizing free and fair elections. This is
why this Part only deals with the democratic legitimacy of
governments. That does not mean, however, that democratic
legitimacy is of no relevance at all in the case of international
organizations. As will be argued in Part III.B, criteria pertaining
to the legitimacy of origin is no longer entirely alien to the
assessment of the legitimacy of international organizations. For
the time being, however, this section only deals with the
democratic legitimacy of governments.
In the case of the legitimacy of governments, it is important
to realize that, while possibly constituting a customary
international legal obligation, the breach of which triggers the
legal consequences described above, democracy has
simultaneously become a fundamental criterion for the
legitimization of governments in the sense that, today, a new
government hardly qualifies as the legitimate representative of a
state if it has not been democratically elected.51 This formidable
development is not a consequence of the abovementioned
obligation to have democratic institutions, but rests on the
discretion of states to choose whether to recognize a new
government. There is indeed no such obligation not to recognize
nondemocratic governments. As mentioned above, the
obligation to be democratic does not constitute a jus cogens norm.
Even if it were a jus cogens norm, it is not certain that a state, in
recognizing a nondemocratic government, would also recognize
as legal the violation of the obligation to be democratic.52
Even though this does not correspond to any legal
obligation, it seems uncontested that, since the end of the Cold
War, the (external) legitimacy of an authority has come to

51. See d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 887–88.
52. See D’ASPREMONT, supra note 35, at 151.

2011]

LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

203

depend almost entirely upon its democratic character.53 The idea
of a government based on the will of the people, “expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures”54—which during the Cold War had been
loosely interpreted by states to legitimize any sort of
government—is now understood to require a democratic
political regime. Thus, there is little doubt today that democracy
has become a prominent means by which to assess the legitimacy
of governments.55 This is not to say that a nondemocratic
government will never be deemed legitimate, especially if that
government has been in power for a long time.56 The
nondemocratic character of a government is sometimes
disregarded because of overriding geopolitical and strategic
motives.57 But, leaving these exceptional situations aside, it can
reasonably be argued that, since the end of the Cold War,

53. See Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 193
(“Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly
through free and fair elections.”). Contra ROTH, supra note 29, at 417.
54. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 21, U.N. G.A.O.R.,
3d. Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of
equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be
the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic
and genuine elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Id. This idea has been underpinned by many UN General Assembly resolutions. See, e.g.,
G.A. Res. 56/159, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/159 (Dec. 19, 2001); G.A. Res. 52/129, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/52/129 (Dec. 12, 1997); G.A. Res. 49/190, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/190 (Dec.
23, 1994); G.A. Res. 48/131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/131 (Dec. 20, 1993); G.A. Res.
47/138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/138 (Dec. 18, 1992); G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/137 (Dec. 17, 1991); G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (Dec. 18,
1990); G.A. Res. 43/157, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/157 (Dec. 8, 1988).
55. Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J.
INT’L L. 489, 494 (2001); Franck, supra note 18, at 46.
56. See Marcelo G. Kohen, La création d’Etats en droit international contemporain [The
Creation of States in Contemporary International Law], 6 COURS EURO-MÉDITERRANÉENS
BANCAJA DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 546, 619 (2002) (this has led some authors to
contend that there exist “double standards” in that regard).
57. The most obvious example is the government of the People’s Republic of
China, which is seen as legitimate by almost all countries in the world although it does
not rest on any free and fair electoral process. The same cannot be said with respect to
Pakistan since the government has relentlessly pledged to organized democratic
elections. See infra note 84.
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democracy has become “the touchstone of legitimacy”58 for any
new government.
Because democracy has turned into one of the central
measures to appraise the legitimacy of governments, it is
important to clarify how democratic legitimacy applies against
the backdrop of the abovementioned distinction between the
legitimacy of origin and the legitimacy of exercise. In the context
of democracy, it is submitted here that the legitimacy of origin
addresses the procedural elements of democracy that ensure that
the authority originates in popular sovereignty through free and
fair elections. A democratic legitimacy of exercise, on the contrary,
rests on some of the substantive elements of democracy. The
application of the distinction between legitimacy of exercise and
legitimacy of origin in the context of democracy thus
presupposes the existence of a substantive understanding of
democracy. It must be acknowledged that the idea is slightly
controversial.
Indeed the question of whether democracy includes only
procedural elements or also embodies substantive features has
gripped the theory59 and the practice60 for a long time. Given the
58. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 599 (1999).
59. See LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 8–9
(1999) (lambasting an “electoral” conception of democracy); Gills et al., supra note 40,
at 21 (criticizing a “cosmetic” conception of democracy because of its “low intensity”);
see also MARKS, supra note 32, at 52, 57–75 (the expression “low intensity democracy”
alludes to the American strategy of containment known as “low intensity warfare”).
Relying on a definition of democracy close to that supported by theorists like John Rawls
(A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)), Carl Schmitt (LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer
trans., Duke University Press, 2004) (1932)), or even Friedrich A. Hayek (supra note 9,
at 227), these authors have put forward a substance-oriented conception of democracy
embodying compliance with human rights. See Brad R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic
Progress, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 493–
95; Thomas Carothers, Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in
International Law, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 261, 264 (1992).
60. This debate between procedural democracy and substantive democracy has also
been echoed in the interpretation of the major human rights conventions. These
instruments—though they often enshrine a right to political participation through
regular elections—are hardly explicit on whether an electoral process is the core
element of a democratic regime. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Independent States
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 29, May 26, 1995, 3
I.H.R.R. 212; ICCPR, supra note 46, art. 25; American Convention on Human Rights art.
23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
This is probably because such an affirmation would have barred their adoption by all the
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complex character of the concept of democracy61 and its bent for
relentless re-contextualization,62 scholars will probably never
agree on the accurate meaning of democracy.63 But this should
not prevent a discussion of its main components. It does not
seem unreasonable to defend here that the concept of
democracy includes some substantive requirements, namely some
basic political freedoms and civil rights64 and hints of the rule of
law. The reason why some political and civil human rights are
included in the concept of democracy can be traced back to the
democratic procedural requirements themselves. There can
hardly be a free democratic process if basic political rights are
infringed. The “freedom”65 of elections must take place in a “free
communist regimes during the Cold War. It is not to say that these instruments do not
refer in any manner to a democratic regime. Indeed, the qualifying clauses are usually
phrased as to limit interferences with the exercise of human rights with “what is
necessary in a democratic society.” ICCPR, supra note 46, art. 4; ECHR, supra arts. 8–11.
According to some authors, this implies that a democratic regime is the sole type of
governmental system where human rights are respected. See James Crawford, Democracy
and International Law, 64 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 113, 115 (1993). Whether this is true or not,
these qualifying clauses more certainly imply that democratic principles are the best
means to assess the acceptability of interference with some human rights. Be that as it
may, the idea that democracy furthers the compliance of human rights and, cogently,
that these instruments somehow lay down an obligation pertaining to the adoption of a
democratic regime has emerged from both the practice and the interpretation provided
by the monitoring bodies of these instruments. See United Communist Party of Turkey v.
Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998).
61. Martti Koskenniemi, Intolerant Democracies: A Reaction, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 231,
234 (1996) (responding to Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36
HARV. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995)).
62. See MARKS, supra note 32, at 151.
63. But see Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 90.
64. Even though these authors admit that dire economic conditions can impinge
on the freedom of the fairness of any electoral process, these authors contend that
economic, social, and cultural rights are alien to the idea of democracy. These rights are
not aiming at a democratic organization of the power, but rather a form of social and
distributive justice. See e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 231
(Routledge & Kegan Paul eds., 1960) (asserting that distributive justice is
nondemocratic). But see IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999); Molly Beutz,
Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 387, 418
(2003).
65. The freedom of elections is a more continuous assessment (mostly focused on
the period of time prior to the elections and the respect of political freedoms), while the
fairness of elections is all about the electoral process itself. The fairness of elections is
related to the regularity of elections, which excludes any manipulation by any of the
competing parties. This requirement is mostly concerned with the rigging of elections.
Fairness is probably the requirement the respect of which is the most difficult to
monitor, despite the huge amount of resources devoted to international elections
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market of ideas”66 that assures free political competition.67 To
ensure free competition in this market of ideas, the respect for
basic political freedoms must be ensured. The organization of a
“free” electoral process requires respect for the freedoms of
expression, assembly, thought, press, etc.68 These freedoms are
“democratic rights”69 or, as stated by the UN Commission on
Human Rights, “rights pertaining to democratic governance.”70
In that sense, one can contend that the requirement of free
elections already encompasses a substantive component, namely,
compliance with the political freedoms ensuring pluralism. It
does not seem unreasonable to contend that the concept of
democracy also includes respect for the rule of law. As the UN
Human Rights Committee has emphasized, there can hardly be a
free and fair election if the rules regulating the electoral process
have not been established prior to the holding of the election or
have not been complied with by the authorities.71
monitoring by both intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. In practice, only
obvious and large-scale riggings will be reported (if the state has consented to
international elections monitoring or asked for international assistance) and will
prevent the elections from being deemed as conferring democratic and legitimate
power to the government.
66. Franck, supra note 18, at 90.
67. Beutz, supra note 64, at 418.
68. See G.A. Res. 55/96, ¶ i, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Feb. 28, 2001) (on the
promotion and consolidation of democracy); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1999/57,
Promotion of the Right to Democracy, E/CN.4/RES/1999/57, ¶ 1(a) (Apr. 27, 1999);
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/46, Further Measures to Promote and
Consolidate Democracy, E/CN.4/2002/200, ¶ 1 (Apr. 23, 2003); Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and
the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7
(July 12, 1996) [hereinafter General Comment No. 25]; see also United Communist Party of
Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 121; Open Door Counselling Ltd. v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R.
244, 268 (1992); Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407, 407 (1986); Handyside v.
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 737, 762 (1972); Compulsory Membership in
an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 69 (Nov. 13, 1985); OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept.
11,
2001,
available
at
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/
Democractic_Charter.htm. See generally Marc Cogen & Eric De Brabandere, Democratic
Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 669 (2007) (discussing
the application of these rights in post-conflict reconstruction).
69. Richard J. Arneson, Democratic Rights at the National Level, in PHILOSOPHY AND
DEMOCRACY 95 (Thomas Christiano ed., 2003).
70. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1997/64, Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, 67th mtg., E/RES/1997/64, ¶ 2(b) (Apr. 16, 1997); see also General
Comment No. 25, supra note 68, ¶ 12.
71. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 68, ¶ 10.
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The inclusion of substantive elements in the concept of
democracy seems underpinned by contemporary international
relations, for states often voice their support for “democratic
values.”72 Likewise, in cases of massive and gross violations of
human rights, states tend to deny the democratic character of the
responsible states.73 The mere fact that an infringement of the
rule of law and human rights, whatever its extent, prompts
systematic disapproval in the name of democracy demonstrates
that, in practice, democracy has been construed as including
certain substantive elements.
If, as it is argued here, democracy embraces some
substantive elements, then the distinction between origin and
exercise proves of fundamental relevance, and any monolithic
conception of legitimacy reveals itself insufficient to explain how
legitimacy of global actors is appraised in a post-Cold War world.
From the standpoint of democratic legitimacy of origin, a
government is legitimate if it rests on the “will of the people,”
expressed through a free and fair electoral process. From the
vantage point of democratic legitimacy of exercise, a government
is legitimate if it exerts its power in a manner consistent with basic
political freedoms and the rule of law. Drawing on this distinction
between the democratic legitimacy of origin and the democratic
legitimacy of exercise, the next section tries to outline how the
legitimacy of global actors is evaluated.

72. Commonwealth of Nations, Coolum Declaration (Mar. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/34293/35468/35799/coolum.htm; see
also Jo Johnson, EU Observer Attacks Big Flaws in Afghan Poll, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at
12 (noting an EU observer’s skepticism that democracy would take hold following the
elections in Afghanistan).
73. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/7, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/7 (Oct. 11, 1991) (on Haiti);
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 55/18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/18 (Apr. 23,
1999) (on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); OAS,
Declaration on Democracy in Venezuela, OAS Doc. AG/DEC. 28 (XXXII-O/02) (June 4,
2002); Third International Conference of the New or Restored Democracies on
Democracy and Development, Sept. 2–4, 1996, Progress Review and Recommendations,
Adopted by the Third International Conference of the New or Restored Democracies on
Democracy and Development Held at Bucharest from Sept. 2–4, 1997, in Note Verbale
dated Sept. 10, 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/52/334 (Sept. 11, 1997).
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III. CONTEMPORARY OSCILLATIONS BETWEEN EXERCISE
AND ORIGIN
This section aims to demonstrate that the legitimacy of
governments and the legitimacy of international organizations
are subject to contradictory logic. On the one hand, it will be
shown that, in modern practice, the legitimacy of governments—
classically judged from the standpoint of the origin of its
powers—is incrementally tested on the basis of legitimacy of
exercise.74 On the other hand, when the legitimacy of
international organizations is at stake, it will be explained that
their legitimacy is increasingly evaluated from the vantage point
of their origin, as opposed to legitimacy of exercise, which has
been the classic measure of their legitimacy.
A. Legitimacy of Governments: From Origin to Exercise
The question of governmental legitimacy has always been a
source of great controversy. This can be traced back to a basic
reality of the international order, namely, that states act through
their governments. The international order is consequently an
order in which its main actors act via proxies. These surrogates
are not, however, immutable entities. Indeed, governments are
short-lived bodies whose existence is contingent upon the form or
stability of the political regime of the state concerned, and
ultimately, the life span of the human beings at their helm. This
means that the representatives of the states in the international
order are frequently replaced. This recurrent and inescapable
change of governments has prompted a need for criteria to
determine who is entitled to speak and act on behalf of each
state. This necessity to constantly identify each state’s
representative in the international arena lies at the heart of the
question of legitimacy of governments in international relations.
The highly controversial character of governments’
legitimacy mostly stems from the subjectivity of its evaluation.
Indeed, there are no objective criteria to determine
governments’ legitimacy. That means that each state enjoys
comfortable leeway when asked to recognize the power of an
entity that claims to be another state’s representative in their
74. This section constitutes a condensed version of the abovementioned article,
d’Aspremont, supra note 22.

2011]

LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

209

bilateral intercourse. International relations are therefore replete
with situations where a government is deemed legitimate by some
states and illegitimate by others.
It is submitted here that, despite the prominent role played
by elections in legitimizing governments in contemporary
practice, the “monopoly” of the legitimacy of origin to gauge the
legitimacy of governments has recently been curtailed by the
growing importance of the legitimacy of exercise. This means that for a
government to be seen as legitimate, it must not only be “by the
people” but also “for the people.”
The authors have analyzed this practice elsewhere75 and
contemporary developments have confirmed it;76 it would be of
no avail to reiterate conclusions here. It suffices to recall that in
the practice pertaining to recognition, accreditation, and
intervention demonstrate that both the origin and exercise of
power have played a role in evaluating governments’ legitimacy.
The legitimacy of origin has remained the decisive factor.
However, recent practice shows that more emphasis has been put
on the legitimacy of exercise. To understand the different roles
played by the two types of legitimacy, and hence the paradigm
shift, one must draw a distinction between the qualification and
disqualification of governments. If a new government secures
international recognition or its delegates are accredited, it
qualifies as the legitimate representative entitled to speak and act
on behalf of the state. But lack of legitimacy can have a
disqualifying function when a government, previously recognized
as the legitimate representative entitled to act and speak on
behalf of a state, loses this recognition. In other words, it is
disqualified from being the representative of that state. In the case
of intervention by invitation, disqualification occurs when the
state’s requests for intervention are refused. In the case of the
accreditation of delegates by international organizations,
disqualification occurs when the state’s delegates are refused
accreditation. This Article argues that the effect of the legitimacy
of origin test has been confined to a qualification role, whereas the
75. See id.
76. See, for instance, the recent debate about the increase of American military
efforts in Afghanistan on the occasion of which the American administration has
engaged in a review of the legitimacy of the Karzai government. See, e.g., Peter Baker &
Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Wants Afghan “Partner,” INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 20, 2009, at 3.
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legitimacy of exercise has been confined to a disqualification
function.
1. Qualifying Governments: The Primary Role of the Legitimacy
of Origin
The question of whether a regime qualifies as the legitimate
government of a state has almost always been resolved through
the legitimacy of origin test. States must determine the legitimate
authority entitled to act and speak on behalf of a state in
instances of recognition and accreditation. As illustrated by the
discussion above, a new government will typically be recognized
so long as its power originates from a free and fair electoral
process. It has also been shown that such democratic origins can
usually overcome a government’s ineffectiveness. In the case of
credential controversies within international organizations, only
the democratic (or constitutional) origin of a government
generally matters. When the question of the qualification of a
new government arises, only the legitimacy of origin has been
considered. The way in which government exercises (or plans to
exercise) its power has been discounted so long as it has been
democratically (and constitutionally) elected.
The exercise of power has, on the other hand, been the
basis for the disqualification of a government previously
considered the legitimate representative of a state. A legitimately
elected government can lose its legitimacy and be barred from
speaking and acting on behalf of the state because its exercise of
power conflicts with substantive elements of democracy. This is
well illustrated by the aforementioned practice regarding
invitations for intervention. Likewise, the UN General Assembly
disqualified the government of South Africa due to the way in
which the government was exercising its power, namely, through
its racist apartheid policy.
This distribution of roles between the legitimacy of exercise
and the legitimacy of origin is not at all surprising. Indeed, no
one disputes the necessity in contemporary international
relations for a swift assessment of governments’ legitimacy to
determine who can act and speak on behalf of a state. Indeed, no
state or international organization can afford to leave the
determination of the legitimacy of a foreign government—upon
which any conclusion as to who can act on behalf of the foreign
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state depends—pending for long. Against this backdrop, it is not
surprising that legitimacy of exercise is avoided in qualification
situations. An appraisal of the legitimacy of a government’s
exercise of power necessarily requires that the government has
exercised power over a period of time. In cases of an
unconstitutional change of government or credentials
controversies, there has yet to be any “exercise” of power. As
such, the legitimacy of exercise test does not comport with the
necessity for swift determination of a state’s legitimate
representatives.77 In this context, the origin of power has been
seen as a more appropriate test of legitimacy. It is easy to
understand how the origin of a government can be quickly
assessed.78 Legitimate origins entail a free and fair electoral
77. The refusal of accreditations of the delegates of South Africa during the
apartheid period for reasons pertaining to legitimacy of exercise was possible because
the credentials of delegates are reviewed every year and the apartheid government had
been in power for a significant period of time. For an analysis of this question, see
d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 903.
78. It must be pointed out, however, that the primarily qualificatory role of
legitimacy of origin has been possible only because the periodicity of electoral process,
has been downplayed. That means that the periodicity of elections (and the related
willingness of the democratically elected government to undergo future electoral
processes) is not taken into account when determining the legitimacy of government.
This practice demonstrates that the evaluation of the legitimacy of origin generally does
not include any consideration of the sustainable character of electoral origins. It could
be reasonably argued that this contempt for the criterion of periodicity of elections
probably conflicts with several international texts. See, e.g., International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 46, art. 25 (“Every citizen shall have the right and
the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions: . . . (b) [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors . . . .”) (emphasis
added); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 54, art. 21 (“The will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”) (emphasis added); see also
G.A. Res. 55/96, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Feb. 28, 2001) (on promoting and
consolidating democracy); General Comment No. 25, supra note 68, ¶ 9. For additional
General Assembly resolutions concerned with “[s]trengthening the role of the UN in
enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and
promotion of democratization,” see generally G.A. Res. 58/180, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/180 (Mar. 17, 2004); G.A. Res. 56/159, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 52/129,
supra note 54; G.A. Res. 50/185, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/185 (Mar. 6, 1996); G.A. Res.
49/190, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 48/131, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 47/138, supra note 54;
G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 45/150, supra note 54; G.A. Res. 43/157,
supra note 54; Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 68, art. 4. On the periodicity
of elections and what it actually means, see Sarah Joseph, Rights and Political Participation,
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process, so foreign states can typically just rely on the accounts of
elections monitoring missions sent by international organizations
to quickly make their decisions.79 To put it differently, free and
fair elections are “easier to capture” than the substantive
elements of democracy.80 This is the reason why the legitimacy of
exercise has not played a role in the qualification of governments
and has been confined to a disqualification function.
Qualification of governments has almost exclusively rested on the
legitimacy of origin.
2. Illiberal Democracies: Turning to the Legitimacy of Exercise
Having demonstrated that the legitimacy of origin has
played an important qualification role while the legitimacy of
exercise has been moderately used in disqualification situations,
mostly in situations of intervention by invitation, this Article
argues that the disqualification role of legitimacy of exercise is
due to increase dramatically with respect to the recognition of
governments and the accreditation of their delegates within
international organizations because of the persistence of illiberal
democracies. By “illiberal democracy” this Article means a
democratically elected government exercising its powers in
violation of the substantive elements of democracy.81 There are
many nations whose governments are elected through a more or
less free and fair electoral process, but commit blatant violations
of human rights. To identify just a few examples, recent elections
in Egypt,82 Iran,83 Pakistan,84 Palestine,85 and Tunisia86 may well
in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED
KINGDOM 535, 554 (David Harris & Sarah Joseph eds., 1995).
79. For example, see the electoral missions set up by the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights at http://www.osce.org/odihr/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2010). Regarding UN electoral missions, see G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 54, ¶ 3 (on
enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections); U.N.
Secretary-General, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine
Elections: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/46/609 (Dec. 19, 1991)
(discussing the close relationship between UN electoral missions and election
processes). See generally Margaret Satterthwaite, Human Rights Monitoring, Elections
Monitoring, and Electoral Assistance as Preventive Measures, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709
(1998).
80. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracies, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec.
1997, at 22, 40 (1997).
81. See id. at 22.
82. See Michael Slackman et al., Egypt Pushes 2-Year Delay in Local Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2006, at A1.
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have been free, but the elected government has not always
proved committed to respecting basic human rights.
The persistence of illiberal democracies has already
prompted some Western states to reconsider their policy in
matters of democratization.87 These policies have, so far, largely
relied on the assumption that free and fair elections directly
correspond with respect for human rights.88 This Article argues
that among the changes that will be brought about by the
persistence of illiberal democracies in the international arena
will be a revamping of the way that governmental legitimacy is
assessed. More specifically, this Article argues that the legitimacy
of exercise will play a greater disqualification role in the
accreditations processes within international organizations.
Indeed, in the case of the accreditation of delegates from a
democratically elected government, the legitimacy of exercise
could be a factor prompting the refusal of credentials. An
international organization could refuse to recognize delegates
from a government whose exercise of power is significantly at
odds with the substantive elements of democracy. Denying
accreditation to delegates from illiberal democracies would
undoubtedly increase the disqualification role of the legitimacy
of exercise, as a government would be judged according to the
manner in which it exercises power.
Likewise, illiberal democracies will drive states to reconsider
their policy on recognition. The legitimacy of exercise could
affect recognition in two ways. First, it could induce states to not
83. See Michael Ignatieff, Iranian Lessons, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 51.
84. See Barry Bearak, Awaiting Clinton, Pakistani Takes Election Step, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2000, at A8; Barry Bearak, Democracy in Pakistan: Can a General Be Trusted?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, § 1, at 12; Jane Perlez, Clinton Decides to Visit Pakistan, After All, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at A12.
85. See Steven Erlanger, After the Elections: The Leadership; Hamas Leader Sees No
Change Toward Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 1, at 1; Francis Fukuyama, After
Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2006, at 67; James Glanz, The World: Blowback;
A Little Democracy or a Genie Unbottled, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 4, at 1.
86. See Editorial, Undemocratic Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at A18.
87. This phenomenon has, for example, triggered an important debate about the
United States’ foreign policy priorities. See Hassan M. Fattah, Arab Democracy, a U.S. Goal,
Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1; Steven R. Weisman, Diplomatic Memo; Democracy
Push by Bush Attracts Doubters in Party, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at A1.
88. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 60; see also Organization of American States (OAS):
Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 7, Sept. 11, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289; United
Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 20–22 (1998).
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recognize a government whose expected policies are likely to be
contrary to the substantive elements of democracy. Second, if the
expected exercise of power does not deter states from granting
recognition, a subsequent exercise of power inconsistent with
human rights could then lead to a withdrawal of previous
recognition.
It must be acknowledged that the withdrawal of recognition
is extremely rare in practice. The withdrawal of recognition of
the government based in Taiwan and the simultaneous
recognition of the communist government based in Beijing as
the government of China may be one of very few examples.89 The
growing importance of legitimacy of exercise could spawn a
sweeping change in this respect, thereby making withdrawal of
recognition of governments more common. Contemporary
practice already contains some hints of this leaning, as is
illustrated by the partial withdrawal of recognition of the branch
of the Palestinian Authority controlled by Hamas.90
Because the legitimacy of governments is assessed in a few
specific situations, states have only a limited number of tools to
deal with the difficulties caused by illiberal democracies.
Recognition and accreditation are two of these instruments, and
it would be surprising if they were not used to fight the
persistence of illiberal democracies. Accordingly, this Article
argues that there will be an expansion of the disqualification role
of the legitimacy of exercise through the practice of the
recognition of governments and the accreditation of delegates
within international organizations. These changes would thus
underpin the disqualification role already played by the
legitimacy of exercise in situations of intervention by invitation.

89. See Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of Recognition and the Status of the
Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE. L. 193, 193 (1989); Victor H. Li, The Law of NonRecognition: The Case of Taiwan, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 134, 134 (1979). On the legal
status of dependent states, see generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 198–220 (1979).
90. In addition to suspending aid to the government, several countries completely
severed their relations. See Steven R. Weisman & Craig S. Smith, U.S. and Europe Halt Aid
to Palestinian Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2006, at A6; Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Digs In
on Withholding Aid to Hamas Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A12. But see Joel
Brinkley, France Backs Putin on Speaking to Hamas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at A7; Steven
Lee Myers & Greg Myre, In Moscow, Hamas Delegation Gets a Warning and a Crash Course
in Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at A6.
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This section has argued that the disqualification role of
legitimacy of exercise is currently gaining momentum. This
tendency represents a paradigm shift in the manner in which
legitimacy of governments is appraised. The next section will
show that the practice pertaining to international organizations
has experienced the exact opposite phenomenon.
B.

Legitimacy of International Organizations: From Exercise to Origin

From
a
conventional
perspective,
international
organizations derive their legitimacy from the powers that have
been conferred to them by the member states of that
organization. The source of their powers is thus only very briefly
tested through the consent of states when signing the
constitutional treaty of the organization.91 In this sense, the
legitimacy of origin of international organizations is not
necessarily a controversial issue. Consequently, international
organizations need to ensure that they exercise their powers in
conformity with the functions assigned to them by the states.
Therefore, international organizations traditionally buoy their
legitimacy by ensuring that decision making in respect to the
exercise of their specific functions is in conformity with the
institutional law of the organization and international law. This is
a manifestation of what previous sections described as the
legitimacy of exercise.
It is submitted here that the way in which authority is
exercised by international organizations—traditionally viewed as
the criterion that measures the legitimacy of these institutions—
is increasingly subjected to the growing importance of how
authority to exercise certain activity is granted to international
organizations, i.e., the legitimacy they can derive from the origin
of their power. Recent developments in the role and functions of
international organizations, such as the increasing involvement
of international organizations in the exercise of governmental
functions, have indeed caused a cross-fertilization of both forms
of legitimacy, with a clear move from the legitimacy of exercise to
various forms of legitimacy of origin. The question of how power
is bestowed upon international organizations, especially for those
91. On the idea of consent as a basis of legitimacy, see Buchanan, supra note 1, at
90–94.

216 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:190
activities having potential or effective far-reaching influence on
the daily lives of citizens, has become an essential question in
international law and international relations. This section starts
by depicting the traditional conception of institutional legitimacy
before turning to several developments that evidence the move
toward the legitimacy of origin of international organizations.
This section then addresses how the dual character of the
legitimacy of international organizations has manifested itself in
the reconstruction and administration of states in post-conflict
situations.92
1. International Organizations and the Legitimate Exercise of
Powers
International organizations, although created by states,
cannot be seen as their equivalent, especially in terms of
democratic legitimacy. Decision making at the international level
by international organizations lacks any direct electoral
foundation since they have no direct popular legitimacy of
origin. For these reasons, the functioning of international
organizations and global governance is often generally
considered to be naturally illegitimate93 or “undemocratic.”94
However, since an international organization is created by
states, the source and legitimacy of the exercise of powers by
international organizations is derived from the consent validly
expressed by the different states party to the constitutional treaty
of the organization. Since states and their governments are to be
considered as the legitimate representatives of the population in
their territory, under the conditions described and discussed in
the sections above, the delegation of certain powers to
international organizations by these representatives is indirectly
based on a form of popular consent. Consequently, the exercise
of powers by international organizations cannot be considered

92. On the contemporary practice of international administration of territories, see
DE BRABANDERE, supra note 20.
93. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1515 (2006).
94. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2017–
21 (2004).
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illegitimate by definition, although its legitimacy will often not be
“democratic” as is traditionally understood.95
In light of this lack of direct legitimacy of origin, and the
absence of a periodical legitimacy or accountability test through
direct elections or any other mechanism, the legitimacy of
international organizations has been classically addressed
through the way in which the functions were exercised, i.e.,
through the legitimacy of exercise. The exercise of powers by
international organizations is then subjected to a legitimacy
assessment principally through the procedures followed,96 often
referred to as input legitimacy.97 From a legal perspective, the
most obvious method to ensure the legitimate exercise of powers
by an international organization, with a focus on the procedural
aspects of decision making, is to ensure that the decisions are in
conformity with the legal obligations of the international
organization,98 particularly in terms of the legal restraints
stemming from the application of international law and the
organization’s constitution. Especially when international
organizations take actions that have a potential impact on human
rights, such as in the case of the Security Council, there is a
tendency to subject this exercise of power to some form of ex
post facto legitimacy or legality check.99 Traditionally, the
international community views as legitimate an international

95. See Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 646
(1999).
96. On the issue of procedural legitimacy and fairness, see FRANCK, supra note 5, at
204–07; Franck, supra note 5, at 705. Another method is to assess the substantive
outcome of the decisions of international organizations, which is, however, more a
question of effectiveness of the organizations than a question of legitimacy and legitimate
exercise of functions. On the issue of substantive legitimacy, see Rüdiger Wolfrum,
Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of Administrative Functions: The Example of
the International Seabed Authority, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
International Fisheries Organizations, 9 GER. L.J. 2039, 2040 (2008). The substantive
outcome of the decisions of international organizations is then referred to as output
legitimacy.
97. See generally Markus Krajewski, International Organizations or Institutions,
Democratic Legitimacy, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008).
98. With respect to Security Council actions, see ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII
POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2004).
99. See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW
221–28 (2d ed. 2009).
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organization’s decision when made within the limits of its
constitutional treaty.100
Of course, the issue of legitimacy is closely connected to the
accountability of international organizations, which functions as
a test for the legitimate exercise of power. It is an issue that has
been taken up, inter alia, by the International Law Association’s
Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations.
The Committee, in its final report, noted that “as a matter of
principle, accountability is linked to the authority and power of
an [international organization]. Power entails accountability,
that is, the duty to account for its exercise.”101 The Committee
identified three levels of accountability. The first level is nonlegal, and relates to the extent to which international
organizations, in the exercise of their functions, subject
themselves to certain forms of “internal and external scrutiny
and monitoring.”102 The second and third levels concern tortbased liability and international responsibility for breaches of
rules of international or institutional law, respectively. The
importance of the latter two forms of accountability is also shown
through the recent work of the International Law Commission in
the codification and progressive development of rules regarding
the responsibility of international organizations.103 These three
levels of accountability, including the work of the International
Law Commission on the responsibility of international
organizations, are manifestations of the traditional measurement
of the legitimacy of international organizations, which is how the
functions are exercised.
Against this backdrop, and taking into account the
legitimacy of international organizations derived from the
consent expressed by the member states, the debate on the
legitimacy of origin of international organizations is, in theory,
relatively unequivocal. International organizations habitually,
and as a matter of principle, have no ambition to govern a place
100. See id.; THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 219–21 (1995).
101. COMM. ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INT’L ORGS., INT’L LAW ASS’N [ILA],
FINAL REPORT, BERLIN CONFERENCE 5 (2004).
102. Id.
103. For the latest report of the Special Rapporteur and discussion of this topic in
the International Law Commission, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., Supp.
No. 10, May 4–June 5, July 6–Aug. 7, U.N. Doc. A/64/10 (2009).
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or people. Therefore, the need to establish legitimacy of origin
appears to be a theoretical issue only. Of course, the question of
the legitimacy of origin of international organizations has
particular relevance for those organizations that have activities
that go beyond mere technical interstate cooperation.104 This is
also why the question of the legitimacy of origin of international
institutions has traditionally not been addressed in international
legal scholarship. Indeed, a few decades ago, the activities of
international organizations had been relatively weak with respect
to effectively exercised authority and the question of their
legitimacy was, as a consequence, of little relevance.105 Thus, one
can say that the combination of the multiplication of areas in
which international organizations are currently involved, and the
altered interconnection and relation between international
organizations and other actors have, from a factual perspective,
sparked the legitimacy debate of international institutions.106
2. Institutional Legitimacy: From the Legitimacy of Origin to
the Legitimacy of Exercise and Back
Traditionally, when an organization’s activity has had an
impact on the state and individuals, international organizations
have, in the exercise of their functions, relied on the general or
ad hoc consent of states.107 However, several developments
confirm that with increasing frequency, international
organizations are seeking to establish a form of legitimacy of
origin beyond the mere consent of the member states and
beyond the legitimacy of the exercise of their functions. As a
consequence, the dual character of the legitimacy of
international organizations has recently been at the forefront of
legal and political discourse through the greater involvement of
organizations in several areas.
The first development toward the establishment of a form of
legitimacy of origin relates to the European Union. The
functioning and legitimacy of the European Union now lies at
the intersection of states and international organizations in terms
104. Krajewski, supra note 97, ¶ 11.
105. Bodansky, supra note 58, at 597.
106. L. Boisson de Chazournes, Changing Roles of International Organizations: Global
Administrative Law and the Interplay of Legitimacies, 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 655, 665 (2009).
107. Bodansky, supra note 58, at 597.
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of democratic legitimacy. Evidence of this is the direct election by
the citizens of the Members of the European Parliament. As
such, the legitimacy of the EU in the exercise of its function is
very well established, since the decisions of the various
institutions of the European Community are, under certain
conditions, subject to direct judicial scrutiny by the General
Court (formerly the European Court of First Instance) or the
Court of Justice. But the direct elections of the members of the
EU Parliament are important for the EU because it adds a
popular legitimacy of origin to the exercise of its functions. This
has particular relevance taking into consideration the undeniably
strong(er) impact of the EU’s decisions on the daily lives of the
European citizens. It is also for the same reason that several
Member States have decided to organize referenda in order to
add a certain popular legitimacy to the proposed institutional
changes.108
The discussions on the reform of the United Nations
Security Council and the need to expand the (permanent)
membership of the Security Council is a second example that
evidences an apparent shift from the legitimacy of exercise to the
legitimacy of origin in assessing institutional legitimacy. The
question of whether a decision is made in conformity with the
UN Charter and principles of international law, i.e., whether a
decision is legitimate from the perspective of the exercise of
functions, is incrementally being complemented by the question
of whether the Security Council as an institution has the
necessary legitimacy to make certain decisions.109 The
recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, which besides suggesting a set of
guidelines to be used by the Security Council in its decisionmaking process (legitimacy of exercise), proposed a reform of
the Council in order to “increase the democratic and

108. See J.H.H. Weiler, A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, 40 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 563 (2002) (discussing the constitutional treaty and the legitimacy question
in the EU). On the question of the referenda, see Jirí Zemánek, Consent of Parliament or
People’s Referendum?, in A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: THE IGC, THE RATIFICATION
PROCESS AND BEYOND 141–48 (Ingolf Pernice & Jirí Zemánek eds., 2005).
109. See generally J. Taubman, Towards a Theory of Democratic Compliance: Security
Council Legitimacy and Effectiveness after Iraq, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 161, 192 (2004).
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accountable nature of the body” (legitimacy of origin).110 Former
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report In
Larger Freedom, also criticized the lack of legitimacy of origin of
the Security Council by stating, “[T]he Security Council has
increasingly asserted its authority and, especially since the end of
the cold war, has enjoyed greater unity of purpose among its
permanent members but has seen that authority questioned on
the grounds that its composition is anachronistic or insufficiently
representative.”111 Therefore, the Secretary-General suggested to
make the Security Council more broadly representative of the
international community as a whole.112 The justification for the
authority of the Security Council is thus no longer seen as a
consequence of state consent to the constitutional treaty of the
organization, which grants certain functions and powers to the
Security Council, but rather the “universal” acceptance of certain
decisions. The guarantee that the Security Council exercises its
functions within the framework and limits set by the UN Charter
and international law thus is increasingly complemented by a
tendency to ensure that the origin of functions exercised by that
organ is “democratic.” Of course, and as noted, these
developments towards the legitimacy of origin are both a
consequence of, and proportional to the impact of the activity of,
the organization on the population. The debate on the
legitimacy of origin of international organizations has little or no
relevance for those organizations of which the direct impact on
the population is limited.
The third development is the increased influence of
international economic and financial institutions on the public
policy decisions of states, and the coinciding renewed attention
paid to the legitimacy of these institutions. In particular, the
involvement of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (“IMF”) in the financial development of states on the one
hand, and the strengthened impact of the World Trade
110. Chair of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, Report of
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, transmitted by Note of the Secretary General, ¶ 249, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec.
2, 2004).
111. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 165, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21,
2005).
112. Id. ¶ 169.
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Organization (“WTO”) and its dispute settlement mechanism on
various non-trade policies on the other hand, have been
subjected to increased scrutiny in terms of legitimacy. As noted in
the previous paragraphs, the legitimacy of many international
organizations has in the past attracted only little attention,
principally because their activity was limited in terms of impact
on the state or the individuals. The growing impact of
international institutions on the domestic affairs of the state, and
thus on the nationals of the state, has brought about an increased
attention to the legitimacy of institutions in taking or imposing
far-reaching measures on the state. International financial and
trade institutions, in particular, have seen a considerable
intensification of the impact of their rules, regulations, and
policies, not only on states, but also and mainly, as a
consequence, on individuals.
For example, the impact of the Bretton Woods institutions
on the human rights situations in states has seriously expanded
in the past decades. Traditionally, international financial
institutions did not have the authority to address human rights
issues under their respective constitutions.113 The World Bank,
for instance, was at its inception prohibited from conditioning
loans on political or non-economic considerations.114 The IMF
also traditionally paid little attention to human rights
considerations, since, as stated by its General Counsel Mr.
Gianviti, the IMF indeed is a monetary agency and not a
development agency.115 These traditional perspectives stand in
contrast with an undeniable amplification of the effects of
international financial institutions’ policies on states and
individuals, which in turn has prompted a debate on the
legitimacy of international financial institutions in general.
Discussions on the legitimacy of international financial and trade
institutions have resulted in a renewed attention to the legitimacy
113. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 142
(2006).
114. See Marc Cogen, Human Rights, Prohibition of Political Activities and the LendingPolicies of Worldbank and International Monetary Fund, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 379 (Subrata Roy Chowdhury et al., eds., 1992).
115. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cult. Rights, Rep. on the
Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Sessions, ¶ 988, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2001/17 (April 23–May 11, August 13–31, November 12–30, 2001); see also
François Gianviti, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary Fund,
in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 132 (Philip Alston ed. 2005).
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of origin of these institutions. As will be discussed, the perceived
lack of legitimacy has principally been remedied by attempts
either to rethink the distribution of voting powers or to accept
some form of public participation in order to ensure a “popular”
acceptance of institutional policies. As far as the latter is
concerned, a clear parallel can be drawn with what was
mentioned earlier with respect to the legitimacy of the EU and
the attempts there to establish some form of popular legitimacy.
When viewed from the traditional perspective, international
financial institutions, like any other international organization,
derive their legitimacy from the powers that have been conferred
on them by the member states of that organization. The source
of their powers is thus principally tested through the consent of
states. However, a unique characteristic of international financial
institutions, such as the IMF, is that the unequal financial
contributions of donor states to the institutions as a whole and to
specific projects in other states has resulted in a departure from
the “traditional” equality in voting rights in favor of a weighted
vote.116 Although the principle of weighted voting can easily be
defended taking into account the financial character of these
institutions,117 this peculiarity has raised the important question
of the legitimacy of the organization especially when dealing with
projects in developing countries that have no or little
representation in the institution.118 The IMF’s recent review of
the distribution of voting power is clear evidence of the attempt
to enhance and reinforce the legitimacy of origin of the IMF
because of the changed factual realities.119

116. See SERGEI A. VOITOVICH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 78 (1995).
117. I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, International Economic Law: General Course on Public
International Law, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 118 (1986); see MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER 210 (1979) (critiquing weighted voting).
118. See N. Matz, Financial Institutions between Effectiveness and Legitimacy—A Legal
Analysis of the World Bank, Global Environment Facility and Prototype Carbon Fund, 5 INT’L
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 265, 270 (2005).
119. See generally ARIEL BUIRA, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without
Legitimacy?, in REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 7–43
(2005); J. M Griesgraber, Reforms for Major New Roles of the International Monetary Fund?
The IMF Post–G-20 Summit, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 179 (2009); D. P. Rapkin & J. R.
Strand, Reforming the IMF’s Weighted Voting System, 29 WORLD ECON. 305 (2006).
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Here one can easily see the interplay between the forms of
legitimacy described and discussed above. While traditionally the
consent of the states, coupled with the exercise of institutional
powers in conformity with the functions assigned to them by the
states and the respect for international law and other internal
procedures, would have been a sufficient legitimacy test, the
growing impact of financial institutions’ policies on both the
state and individuals has prompted new considerations of the
question of the source of the authority of the institution.
The renewed attention to the legitimacy of origin of
international financial institutions is only part of the recent
attempt of these institutions to enhance their legitimacy, and, of
course, is principally based on the “unequal” distribution of
voting power within these institutions. However, besides the
question of how power is bestowed upon these institutions,
enhancing public participation in both decision-making and
dispute settlement processes forms an important part of the
debate.120 To a large extent, public participation is a form of
legitimacy of origin, since it aims to ensure that the general
public supports the exercise of power. Individuals are often seen
as the final recipients of the adopted rules and regulations and
are thus given a sense of ownership in the process.121 This form
of legitimacy of origin thus complements, rather than replaces, the
consent of states as the original legitimacy of international
institutions.
An example of this development at the level of the World
Bank is the establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel.
The Inspection Panel can receive requests for inspection from
any party that is a community of persons, “such as an
organization, association, society or other grouping of
individuals,” who need to show that their “rights or interests have
been or are likely to be directly affected by an action or omission
of the Bank.”122 Although the Inspection Panel will review
whether the Bank is complying with its own policies and
procedures, which essentially is a question of legitimacy of exercise,
120. See Matz, supra note 118, at 271–72.
121. See Bodansky, supra note 58, at 617. See generally Boisson de Chazournes, supra
note 106, at 665 (discussing the links between the concepts of transparency and
participation).
122. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. [IBRD], The World Bank Inspection
Panel, Resolution No. IBRD 93-10, ¶ 12 (Sept. 22, 1993).
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the reason behind the establishment of the Panel is to increase
public participation by non-state actors in the activities carried
out by the World Bank and thus to add legitimacy of origin to the
World Bank.123
A similar development has taken place at the WTO, albeit at
a different level. The “legitimacy gap” at the WTO in fact has
been the result of two different discourses. On the one hand,
representatives from developing member states have had the
impression of being excluded from mainly informal decisionmaking processes. On the other hand, representatives of civil
society criticize the organization for its lack of consideration of
non-state and non-corporate interests in decision-making and
dispute settlement procedures, thus lacking a genuine legitimacy
of origin.124 The first issue essentially relates to a critique of the
legitimacy in the functioning of the organization and thus to the
legitimacy of exercise of the organization, while the latter
fundamentally concerns the need to broaden the legitimacy of
origin of the WTO.
Thus, the legitimacy problem of the WTO is essentially
linked to the difficult societal acceptance of the institution and
its policies.125 This is despite the indisputable existence of a
legitimacy of origin based on the consent of member states,
which is expressed through their signature and ratification of the
WTO constitution. However, since international economic law is
traditionally open only to states, only state—and perhaps
corporate—interests are represented at the WTO level, thus
effectively disregarding broader public or transnational interests.
Trade disputes, however, increasingly involve other policy areas,
such as human rights and environmental issues.126 Since the

123. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Compliance with Operational Standards:
The Contribution of the World Bank Inspection Panel, in THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE
WORLD BANK: A DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 67, 67–85 (Gudmundur Alfredsson
& Rolf Ring eds., 2001).
124. See Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of
WTO Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 167, 167 (2001); Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental
Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 123, 131 (1998).
125. See Esty, supra note 124, at 167–86 (discussing the ways in which the WTO can
embrace NGO participation, thereby improving its economic management role).
126. See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & TradeEnvironment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1043 (1994) (arguing that neither trade
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WTO is ill-equipped to consider such non-state concerns due to
its traditional interstate character, it has habitually been regarded
as closed, lacking both transparency and legitimacy.127 Here
again, one can clearly see that institutional legitimacy is closely
interconnected with the impact of international organizations on
individuals directly or indirectly through policy decisions taken
by the organization.
The legitimacy gap at the WTO has resulted in many
scholarly discussions and proposals to enhance and restore the
legitimacy of the WTO.128 Proposals include, inter alia, an
increased role for national parliaments and even the
establishment of a WTO Parliamentary Assembly.129 These
suggestions, however, although theoretically sound, do not seem
to be realistically practical in the short term. A more realistic
suggestion is to rely on increased public participation and
enhanced transparency.130 Public participation at various stages
of the WTO system, through the representative function of
NGOs, has been envisaged in the legal literature. NGO
participation as amici curiae in dispute settlement procedures,131
but also, for example, their participation through consultation at
the decision-making level and through access to documents, have
been suggested and also partly implemented.132 Similarly, a highbodies, like GATT, which was the predecessor to the WTO, nor adjudicatory bodies are
the right forums for resolving trade or environment disputes).
127. See Sungjoon Cho, A Quest for WTO’s Legitimacy, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 391–99
(2005) (discussing legitimacy as one of the main challenges for the WTO and how
education and social marketing can improve the WTO’s legitimacy); Esty, supra note
124, at 123.
128. See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 106, at 656–66; Krajewski, supra note
97, at ¶¶ 13–24(discussing the different forms of “remedies” to the legitimacy problems
of international institutions).
129. Krajewski, supra note 124, at 183.
130. See Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade
Organization, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 927, 928 (2004).
131. For general information on NGO participation in international dispute
settlement, see Eric De Brabandere, Non-State Actors in International Dispute Settlement:
Pragmatism in International Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM–
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jean
d’Aspremont ed., forthcoming 2011).
132. For an overview of NGO involvement in the WTO, see Yves Bonzon,
Institutionalizing Public Participation in WTO Decision Making: Some Conceptual Hurdles and
Avenues, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 751, 751–77 (2008); Charnovitz, supra note 130, at 927,
939–42; Frank Loy, Public Participation in the World Trade Organization, in THE ROLE OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 113, 118–21 (Gary P.
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level panel report on the future of the WTO issued on the tenth
anniversary of the organization, The Future of the WTO: Addressing
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (otherwise known as
the Sutherland Report), indirectly tackled the WTO’s legitimacy
problem. Without explicitly mentioning the legitimacy of the
WTO, however, the report contains a chapter entitled
“Transparency and Dialogue with Civil Society,” which is aimed
at remedying and countering the often alleged lack of legitimacy
and transparency of the institution.133 NGO and civil society
participation cannot, however, solve every legitimacy problem,
and, as already noted, is insufficient for replacing the legitimacy
of origin conferred on the organization through state consent.
Such participation does not necessarily enhance democratic
legitimacy, since NGO are themselves nondemocratic in the
sense that they are neither generally elected nor accountable to
their members or the general public.134
This section has argued that international organizations
traditionally have, in the exercise of their functions, relied on the
general or ad hoc consent of states to legitimize the exercise of
their powers. Due to the increasing impact of the activities of
international organizations on the state and individuals, however,
international organizations are increasingly seeking to establish a
form of legitimacy of origin that goes well beyond the mere
consent of member states and the legitimacy of exercise, which is
the traditional measuring tool of institutional legitimacy.
3. Institutional Legitimacy and Post-Conflict International
Administrations
Traditionally, the UN’s task in conflict or post-conflict
situations was limited to the deployment of military personnel

Sampson ed., 2001); Peter Van den Bossche, NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Comparative
Perspective, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 718, 718–49 (2008).
133. CONSULTATIVE BOARD TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL SUPACHAI PANITCHAPKDI,
THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 66 (2004); see also Cho, supra note 127, at 391–99.
134. See generally Kenneth Anderson, What NGO Accountability Means—and Does Not
Mean, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 170, 170–78 (2009) (reviewing NGO ACCOUNTABILITY:
POLITICS, PRINCIPLES & INNOVATIONS (Lisa Jordan & Peter van Tuiji eds., 2006)). For a
discussion on the legitimacy of NGOs as participants in international investment
arbitration, see Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment
Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 73 (2003).
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and a limited number of civilian staff to assist or advise the
existing governmental structures. Recent peace-building or postconflict reconstruction missions have been the latest
manifestation of an evolving approach towards situations
presenting a (potential) threat to international peace and
security. International administrations occupy a special place in
this evolution. The cases of Kosovo and Timor-Leste are, to a
certain extent, a culmination of this evolution, since the UN has
taken over the entire administration of the territories in these
post-conflict scenarios.
Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(“NATO”) armed intervention in Kosovo in March 1999, the UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, establishing the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(“UNMIK”).135 Resolution 1244 called upon UNMIK to promote
the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government
in Kosovo; perform basic civilian administrative functions;
support the reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil
law and order; promote human rights; and assure the safe return
of all refugees and displaced persons.136 UNMIK’s authority
included full legislative and executive power in the areas of
responsibility laid out the resolution. A few months later, the
Security Council authorized the establishment of the United
Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (“UNTAET”).137 A
popular consultation, conducted earlier among the Timorese,
had revealed a clear wish on their part to begin a transition
toward independence. In the transitional process, UNTAET was
endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of
Timor-Leste and was empowered to exercise all legislative and
executive authority, including the administration of justice.138
Essentially, the dual character of legitimacy under
international administrations is the consequence of the
functional duality of an international organization’s exercise of
public authority. On the one hand, an international
administration is a subsidiary organ of an international
organization; on the other hand, it functions as the government
135.
136.
137.
138.

S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
Id. ¶ 11(a)–(k).
S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
Id.
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of a territorial entity. The acts of the international administration
are thus both international acts of the international
organizations and internal acts of the state. When such missions
are looked at according to their first capacity, they will be tested
through the legitimacy of exercise. When international
administrations are essentially seen as surrogate national
governments, the tendency is to concentrate on the legitimacy of
origin as the appropriate method of assessing the legitimacy of
the exercise of those functions.
Even if the international community has been somewhat
reluctant in the past to accept the UN’s capacity to take over
territorial administration, one can easily assert that this
controversy is actually at an end.139 Despite some contentions to
the contrary,140 there are clear bases for the legal authority to
exercise administrative functions in post-conflict situations.141
Several articles of the UN Charter can be interpreted to
authorize
peace-building
missions
and
international
administrations, depending on whether or not the consent of the
host state has been obtained. Article 39 of the UN Charter gives
the Security Council the power to make recommendations to the
parties concerned. Operations authorized under this article are,
therefore, based not only on the Security Council’s
recommendatory power, but also on the consent of the state
concerned. Article 41 gives the Security Council the power to
impose measures not involving the use of armed force. In theory,
when the consent of the host state cannot be obtained for
whatever reason, and if a situation presents a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, this article can also be
considered an adequate legal basis to authorize such a mission.
Of course, one might consider that in light of the expanded
interpretation of what constitutes a “threat to international peace

139. See Erika de Wet, The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and
Its Member States in the Post Cold War Era: Legal Basis and Implications for National Law, 8
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 291, 306–40 (2004).
140. See, e.g., Hollin K. Dickerson, Assumptions of Legitimacy and the Foundations of
International Territorial Administration, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 144, 145 (2006).
141. Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 119, 126–28
(2010).
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and security,” the Security Council has a particular duty to act in
good faith when making determinations in this respect.142
If one takes a classical approach to the legitimacy of
international organizations and their exercise of powers, the
establishment of peace-building missions in conformity with the
UN Charter would clearly be sufficient to render international
administrations legitimate. The legitimacy of establishing
international post-conflict administrations is then principally
derived from the procedural and legal validity of the action
taken, i.e., its conformity with the UN Charter and other rules of
international law. However, such activity is also legitimate as a
consequence of the general consent of member states to the
power of the Security Council to deal with situations that can be
categorized as a threat to international peace and security.143 This
is because states delegate certain powers to the Security Council
by being a party to the UN Charter, which grants the UN Security
Council the authority to establish these types of missions. Despite
some reluctance in legal literature to accept the expanding role
of the Security Council and the expanding range of measures the
Security Council adopts under its Chapter VII powers,144 it is
important to note that UN member states have not objected to
recent comprehensive peace-building mandates.145 But despite
these relatively undisputed legal bases, the question has been
raised whether, in light of the impact of such decisions, the
consent of either the host state or host population should not
form the legitimate basis for the exercise of such functions, since
such a requirement would be placed onto a national government
exercising such functions.146

142. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Security Council Governance of Postconflict Societies: A Plea
for Good Faith and Informed Decision Making, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 580–82 (2001).
143. See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation,
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 21 (2008).
144. For a critical overview, see BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 206–07 (3d rev. ed. 2005).
145. As noted by Erika de Wet, the international community has accepted such
mandates, either through explicit support in the General Assembly or indirectly by the
acceptance of the expenses for such missions as expenses of the organization. Erika de
Wet, Beginning and End of Occupation—UN Security Council’s Impact on the Law of
Occupation, 34 COLLEGIUM 34, 37 (2006).
146. See generally Hollin K. Dickerson, Assumptions of Legitimacy: The Foundations of
International Territorial Administration, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 161, 172, 175–77
(2006).
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The consent of the host state is not absolutely necessary
when the Security Council acts under Chapter VII. When
possible, however, the consent of the host state is often sought
and obtained for intrusive reconstruction activities.147 One reason
for this is that from a practical perspective, international
administrations cannot adequately operate without the consent
of the sovereign state. More importantly, however, the specific ad
hoc consent of the host state plays an important function from
the perspective of the legitimacy of international administrative
missions. In addition to the legal basis for the creation of
comprehensive peace-building missions by the Security Council,
the consent of the host state can be sought to enhance the
legitimacy of origin, from an institutional perspective, of the
exercise of such intrusive powers on a state’s territory. The
consent of the host state, in general, to the authority of the
Security Council is then complemented by the specific consent of
the state for a particular type of activity; the legitimacy of exercise
is complemented by the legitimacy of origin.
In the case of Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
explicitly consented to the deployment of both civil and military
personnel.148 Nevertheless, consent was not absolutely necessary,
as UNMIK was established under a Chapter VII resolution. In this
particular case, a purely legal argument could explain why the
Security Council sought the consent of Yugoslavia. The consent
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was crucial given the
ambiguities concerning its membership in the UN, as both the
Security Council149 and the General Assembly150 had clearly
indicated that it could not automatically be seen as the successor
to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal
147. See, e.g., Letter from Dieter Kastrup, Permanent Rep. of Germany to the U.N.,
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (June 7, 1999),
U.N. Doc. S/1999/649 (“[A]greement on the principles (peace plan) to move towards a
resolution of the Kosovo crisis presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”). In the case of Kosovo, the plan presented by Martti Ahtisaari, President of
Finland, and Victor Chernomyrdin, Special Representative of the President of the
Russian Federation, which contained the general principles of an agreement on the
Kosovo crisis, was accepted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See id.; see also S.C.
Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th year, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/55, at 32 (June 10, 1999).
148. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 147, ¶ 5.
149. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 757, ¶ 10, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at 13
(May 30, 1992); S.C. Res. 777, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992).
150. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/1, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 22, 1992).
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Republic was considered by the Secretariat to be the de facto
successor to the Socialist Federal Republic.151 The consent of
Yugoslavia not only legalized the deployment of the mission in its
territory, but it also added the necessary legitimacy to the
authorization of this international administrative mission by the
Security Council.
The case of UNTAET is also rather unusual in this respect,
since Indonesia’s consent was sought in spite of the very doubtful
character of Indonesian sovereignty over Timor-Leste.152 TimorLeste was formally still a non-self-governing territory at the time
of the 1999 popular consultation that led to the establishment of
an international administration. According to the principles
applicable to non-self-governing territories,153 Portugal retained
formal sovereignty over Timor-Leste. However, an agreement was
concluded between Portugal and Indonesia to organize the
referendum and the international administration in the event of
a vote in favor of independence.154 But the consent of Indonesia
in this case could by no means legitimate the creation of an
international administration on the territory of Timor-Leste, and
can perhaps be explained by pragmatism. On the other hand,
the consent of Portugal, which formally had sovereignty over the
territory, had also been obtained through the signature of the
treaty with Indonesia to organize the referendum.155
However, when the consent of the state is problematic, such
as in Timor-Leste, the lack of consent from the host population is
often advanced as the reason such intrusive operations lack
legitimacy.156 The focus here thus shifts from international
administrations as subsidiary organs of international
organizations to international administrations as substitute
151. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶
95 (Feb. 26).
152. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶¶ 15, 31, 37 (June
30); see also Steven R. Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial
Administration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 695, 697 n.6, 698 n.12
(2005).
153. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 613–
15 (2d ed. 2006).
154. Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic
on the Question of East Timor, Indon.-Port., art. 6, May 5, 1999, 2062 U.N.T.S. 8.
155. See, e.g., id. pmbl.
156. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 140, at 145.
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national governments by seeking to establish popular legitimacy
of origin similar to that of national governments. From an
international organization perspective, the legitimacy of these
missions is clearly established, but international administrations
will typically lack the necessary democratic legitimacy usually
required for national governments. Indeed, popular consent has
never been the basis for the establishment of the latest post-conflict
administrations or peace-building missions. Even in Timor-Leste,
when prior to the establishment of UNTAET a referendum had
been organized, the only question put to the citizens was whether
they agreed or not to independence. There was no explicit
ambition to seek consent of the Timorese for the exercise of
administrative powers by the UN, although the choice for an
independent Timor-Leste implied the exercise of such powers by
the organization.
In the absence of popular legitimacy of origin, post-conflict
international administrations have been somewhat forced to
enhance the legitimacy of their exercise of legislative, executive,
and even judicial powers through consultation with national
authorities. This type of legitimacy, although incomplete when
viewed from the standards for national governments set out
above, in fact combines elements relating to the source of
authority (legitimacy of origin) and elements relating to the
legality and thus the legitimacy of the national level decisionmaking process of international administrations in their
government functions (legitimacy of exercise). Former UNTAET
transitional administrator Vieira de Mello explained:
The more powers conferred on local representatives, the
closer power is to the people and thus the more legitimate
the nature of the administration. But conferring power on
non-elected local representatives can also have the undesired
effect of furthering a particular party. The inclination of the
U.N. is thus to be cautious about delegating power in the
interest of avoiding furthering any particular political party.
There is consultation, but all essential decision making and
executive authority remains with the U.N.157

157. Sergio Vieira de Mello, How Not to Run a Country: Lessons for the UN from Kosovo
and East Timor 4 (2000) (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2000/INTERFET%20DETAINEE%
20MANAGEMENT%20UNIT%20(e).pdf.
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At the same time, the former transitional administrator
questioned the appropriateness of such an approach.158
In practice, consultation with local actors has been
paramount to enhancing the legitimacy of such missions, and
local institutions often have been created for this purpose. The
Special Representative in Kosovo, upon his arrival, established a
Kosovo Transitional Council (“KTC”) as a consultative, quasilegislative organ.159 A few months later it was expanded and
integrated into the first Kosovar multi-ethnic governmental
structure: the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (“JIAS”).160
Soon after UNTAET’s arrival, the transitional administrator for
East Timor established the National Consultative Council
(“NCC”), a political body consisting of eleven Timorese and four
UNTAET members, to oversee the decision making by the
international administration.161 The Council’s primary
responsibility was to make policy recommendations on significant
executive and legislative matters, and to consult with the
Timorese on all aspects of UNTAET’s involvement. Review of
UNTAET regulations was included in the Council’s advisory
mandate, and all UNTAET regulations adopted during the
National Consultative Council’s tenure were endorsed by the
Council.162
This section has shown that, although the legitimacy of
international organizations has been traditionally tested only
from the perspective of the legitimacy of exercise, recent
developments show a tendency towards assessing decision-making
power within international organizations also through the lens of
the legitimacy of origin. Of course, the dual character of
legitimacy is most visible when international organizations take
over administrative functions within a state, therefore effectively
158. See id.
159. Press Release, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
[UNMIK], UNMIK Convenes First Meeting of Kosovo Transitional Council; Recruitment
of New Kosovo Police Service Launched; Confidence-Building Measures Agreed (July 16,
1999), U.N. Press Release UNMIK/PR/12.
160. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/1, On the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative
Structure, § 1(c)–(d), U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/1 (Jan. 14, 2000).
161. UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/2, On the Establishment of a National
Consultative Council, §§ 1, 2, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/2 (Dec. 2, 1999).
162. U.N. Secretary-General, Financing of the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor: Rep. Of the Secretary-General, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/54/769 (Mar.
7, 2000).
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combining the two forms of legitimacy. In those cases, the
decision-making process at the institutional level tends to be
supported by both the legal validity of the decisions taken and
the consent of the host state. During the performance of their
missions, international administrations, although legitimate from
an institutional perspective, typically will lack popular legitimacy
of origin. In those circumstances, international post-conflict
administrations have sought to legitimize their activity by
consulting with local ad hoc authorities, which offers some form
of legitimacy of origin in their decision-making power on the
national level.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the complexity of global
governance can hardly be disentangled if one fails to understand
the dual nature of legitimacy of its main actors, i.e., governments
and international organizations. It has been submitted that
legitimacy should, for each of them, be gauged from the
standpoint of both their origin and the way in which they exercise
their powers. Such a distinction has been insufficiently taken into
account in international legal scholarship. While emphasizing
the need for a distinction between the legitimacy of origin and
the legitimacy of exercise for both governments and
international organizations, this Article has tried to demonstrate
that each of these aspects of legitimacy has been given varying
weight. In particular, it has been explained that, with respect to
the legitimacy of governments, the emphasis classically put on
the legitimacy of origin is no longer exclusive, and more
attention is paid to the legitimacy of exercise. Recent practice
and contemporary literature have shown that the question of the
legitimacy of international organizations is no longer solely based
on the way in which these organizations exercise their powers but
also based on their origin. This Article ultimately expresses the
hope that the conceptual clarifications that have been put
forward here will be instrumental in stimulating more
systematized research about legitimacy of global actors in the
context of global governance.

